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Risk and Marketing Behavior: Pricing Fed Cattle on a Grid 
Abstract 
A seven year comparative study of grid pricing versus average pricing of slaughter cattle was 
conducted to evaluate carcass quality market signals. The primary objective of the study is to 
determine if market signals sent through the grid pricing system are encouraging producers to 
market on a grid and discouraging them to market by the pen. Two secondary objectives 
investigate: 1) if price risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty affects marketing 
decisions, and 2) ff a change in price risk (volatility) affects producer marketing decisions. 
An EARCH-ln-Mean modeling procedure was adopted. Empirical results suggest that the grid 
premium and discount structure is slowly adjusting carcass quality market signals to encourage 
marketing on a grid and discourage marketing by the pen. The inclusion o_f the conditional 
variance in the empirical model indicates that risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty is 
a potential barrier to adoption o_f the grid pricing system by producers. 
Risk and Marketing Behavior: Pricing Fed Cattle on a Grid 
The beef industry continues to recover from an extended period of relatively weak 
demand and declining market share for its product (Tonsor 2011 ). The beef industry has 
responded by promoting production and marketing reforms along its entire supply chain. The 
stated goal of these suggested reforms is to transform the beef industry into a value-based 
industry. The blueprint of this initiative is outlined in an industry sponsored white paper: War on 
}at released by the Value Based Marketing Task Force (VBMTF 1990). 
A key component of the initiative is the call for the development of a value based pricing 
system. In the early 1990s the industry began the conversion from the traditional "Grade and 
Yield" pricing system for fed cattle into what is commonly referred to as grid pricing. The goal 
of the beef industry's movement toward value based pricing is to improve the flow of 
information from the consumer to the producer so that the industry is producing the "right 
product at the right price to meet consumer demand" (Fausti et al. 201 Oa: p. 19). 
The grid pricing literature (e.g., Schroeder and Graff 2000; Fausti and Qasmi 2002; 
McDonald and Schroeder 2003; Johnson and Ward 2005) has investigated and discussed in great 
detail the effectiveness of the grid pricing system to transmit market signals to producers with 
respect to carcass quality. This literature has also discussed potential barriers to across-the-board 
producer adoption of grid pricing (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Belasco et al. 2010). Several studies 
have attempted to estimate grid market share of fed cattle slaughter volume ( e.g., Schroeder et al. 
2002; Muth et al. 2007; Fausti et al. 2010a) to determine the level of industry adoption of the 
grid pricing system. However, up to this point, empirical evidence on if the incentive structure 
of the grid pricing system (since its inception) has become a more effective signaling mechanism 
with respect to carcass quality has not appeared in the literature. 
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The objective of this paper is to investigate if the effectiveness of the grid pricing system 
to transmit informative market signals to producers has changed over time. In this study, we 
evaluate grid market signals by comparing the financial incentive structure of the grid system to 
the producer's alternative of selling fed cattle by the pen at an average price. 
The empirical analysis begins with two pens of cattle (1500 head each). We begin by 
simulating per head weekly revenue (grid and dressed weight) for each animal and the revenue 
differential for each animal (grid minus dressed weight). In the next step, weekly pen level 
average per head revenue and the per head revenue differential are derived. As a result, two 
data sets are created containing weekly pen level averages for per head revenue and the per head 
revenue differential for a 381 week period. 
The two pens differ with respect to carcass quality but individual animal carcass 
attributes remained fixed over the timeframe of the study. We employ an EARCH-in-Mean 
regression modeling procedure to analyze the variation in the average per head revenue 
differential for the two pens. The EARCH model is uniquely suited for analyzing the empirical 
issues associated with marketing risk addressed in this study. The EAR CH term (Nelson 1991) 
allows for producers' asymmetric response to good vs. bad news. The "Mean term" (Engle, 
Lilien and Robins 1987) provides an empirical estimator to test for the possibility of a risk 
premium associated with volatility. 
Our empirical results indicate that the incentive to market high (low) quality cattle on a 
grid (by the pen) has increased (decreased) during the timeframe covered in this study. This 
finding indicates that the grid pricing system's role as a value based pricing system is 
strengthening over time. Furthermore, we incorporated the model's conditional variance as an 
explanatory variable and found that market risk does affect the incentive structure associated 
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with the decision to market on a grid or by the pen. The incorporation of price volatility 
modeling tools into the grid pricing literature reflects a contribution to the empirical literature on 
marketing behavior in U.S. livestock markets. 
Literature Review 
Agricultural economists have investigated a number of issues pertaining to the beef industry's 
value based marketing (VBM) initiative for slaughter cattle. A general discussion of this 
literature can be found in Fausti et al. (2010a). The success of the value based marketing 
initiative cannot be measured by a single metric. Consumer acceptance can be measured by 
changes in beef demand over time (Schroeder et al. 2000), or investigated using experimental 
methods (e.g., Umberger 2007). Production efficiency, with respect to carcass quality, has been 
investigated in the context of technological innovation to enhance value based beef production 
and marketing methods (e.g., Lusk 2007; Koontz et al. 2008). 
A white paper (War on Fat) published by the Value Based Marketing Task Force 
(VBMTF 1990) specifically discussed the need for an alternative pricing system to the traditional 
practice of selling fed cattle at an average price by the pen. Selling fed cattle at an average price 
by the pen is '.'iewed by the beef industry (VBMTF: consensus point 7) as an inefficient pricing 
mechanism because it distorts market signals from the consumer to the producer (Feuz et al. 
1993) with respect to carcass quality. The price signal issue arises because selling slaughter 
cattle by the pen at a negotiated price per hundred weight allows pricing error to enter into the 
transaction because carcass quality: a) is unknown at the time of the transaction, and b) is not 
uniform across all animals in a pen. Thus, animals with desirable carcass attributes are paid the 
same price per pound as animals with undesirable carcass attributes. Thus, low quality cattle are 
paid a premium above their actual market value, and high quality cattle are penalized by being 
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paid a price per pound below their actual market value. The implication is that producers who 
sell by the pen do not receive a price signal on carcass quality differences for the animals within 
a pen. 
The introduction of grid pricing mechanisms (GPM) as a value-based pricing system 
alternative to pen level sales reflects the beef industry's desire to improve carcass quality through 
the market mechanism (Fausti et al. 1998). Grid pricing mechanisms have been touted by the 
beef industry and academic researchers as a key component in the development of a value based 
marketing system for fed cattle (Schroeder et al. 1998). The goal of a grid pricing system is to 
provide a mechanism that rewards desirable carcass attributes and discounts undesirable carcass 
attributes, thus providing a market signal that will encourage producers to improve carcass 
quality. 
Agricultural economists have investigated the effectiveness of GPM as a price 
transmission mechanism from consumers to producers (e.g., McDonald and Schroeder 2003; 
Johnson and Ward 2005 & 2006). The general consensus is that carcass weight rather than grid 
premiums and discounts assigned to carcass quality attributes is still a very important component 
of the GPM price signal. Johnson and Ward (2006) report that for cattle with the highest 
(lowest) carcass quality sold on a grid, weight accounted for 79% (50%) of the market signal. 
Furthermore, they report that grid discounts account for 20% and 49.5% of the market signal for 
high quality and the low quality cattle groups in their study, respectively. Their findings are 
consistent with earlier studies that have raised the issue that the GPM premium and discount 
structure may act as a "barrier to adoption" of grid pricing by producers ( e.g., Fausti and Qasmi 
2002). 
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The goal of the VBM initiative is to transform the beef industry's production and 
marketing system along the entire supply chain. To accomplish this goal, a VBM pricing system 
needs to capture a dominant share of fed cattle sales. While grid marketing has increased in 
importance as a pricing method for fed cattle over the last fifteen years, it has not replaced 
average pricing by the pen as the dominant marketing option selected by fed cattle producers. 
Fausti et al. (201 Oa) provides empirical estimates that grid market share of steer and heifer 
slaughter has increased from the low teens in the 1 990s to approximately 45% in 2009. The 
inability of the grid pricing system to capture a dominant share of fed cattle slaughter implies a 
weakness in the incentive mechanism. 
Conceptually, an important objective of GPM as an integral component of a value based 
marketing system is to induce fed cattle producers to sell their cattle on a grid. The benefits to 
producers who sell on a grid touted by the beef industry are: a) producers will be rewarded for 
the above average cattle they sell on a grid, and b) producers will be given detailed information 
on the quality of each individual carcass by the packer. Carcass information and the premiums 
represent the grid market signal to the producer that is absent when cattle are sold at an average 
price by the pen. In tum, the producer will make adjustments to the production system to 
improve the carcass quality of animals sold in the future. However, there is also risk the 
producer must accept. When a producer sells on a grid the producer faces uncertainty 
concerning the average quality of animals being sold. This uncertainty creates a financial risk 
becaus1.; t�11., 1..a�.Je may be of lower quality than the producer expected. The reason why this 
financial ri�.k exists is because all producers have the option of selling cattle by the pen at an 
average price. In this c&se, the buyer (packer) assumes the financial risk associated with carcass 
quality uncertainty. 
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Numerous studies have identified financial risk factors affecting the behavior of buyer 
and sellers in the fed cattle market ( e.g., Feuz et al. 1 995; Anderson and Zeuli 200 1 ;  White et al. 
2007; Belasco et al. 20 10; Fausti et al. 201 3). The Theory of Factor Price Disparity formally 
addresses the financial risk issue associated with carcass quality uncertainty (Fausti and Feuz 
1 995). Fausti and Feuz ( 1995) identified the economic consequences of carcass quality 
uncertainty on buyer pricing decisions and seller marketing decisions. They demonstrate that 
packer's will charge a risk premium when purchasing cattle by the pen due to carcass quality 
uncertainty. They also hypothesize that seller risk preference combined with carcass quality 
uncertainty provides a reasonable explanation for the coexistence for multiple marketing 
alternatives for slaughter cattle. In a recently published article, Fausti et al. (20 12) demonstrate 
that risk preference in conjunction with carcass quality uncertainty does contribute to the 
existence of multiple marketing methods for slaughter cattle. 
The key to accomplishing the beef industry's goal of having a dominant value based 
pricing system is dependent on how effective the grid pricing system's incentive mechanism is at 
transmitting market signals to producers. A key indicator of success would be if the incentive to 
market higher quality cattle on a grid strengthens over time and the disincentive to market lower 
quality cattle on a grid weakens over time. A weakening of the incentive to market lower quality 
cattle by the pen at an average price relative to selling on a grid will encourage producers to 
increase their use of a grid when marketing fed cattle. In tum, information of grid performance 
will encourage producers to adopt value based production practices. According to Fausti et al. 
( 1 998), a key metric of success for the beef industry's value based initiative is a reduction in the 
"barriers to adoption" of its value based pricing system. 
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Thus, a logical approach for evaluating the effectiveness of the GPM incentive 
mechanism is to compare its performance as a signaling mechanism relative to the alternative 
pricing methods available to producers. Evaluating market outcomes for cattle sold on a grid 
relative to cattle sold on a live or dressed weight has been a common practice in the grid pricing 
literature ( e.g., Fausti et al. 1 998; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Anderson and Zeuli 200 1 ). Fausti 
and Feuz ( 1 995) and Feuz et al. ( 1 995) suggest that the price differential between grid and 
average pricing reflects the risk premium buyers (sellers) are willing to pay to accept (avoid) the 
financial risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty. The empirical analysis to follow 
assumes the revenue differential reflects the risk premium associated with carcass quality 
uncertainty. Thus, the empirically estimated weekly revenue differential represents the weekly 
market risk premium associated with carcass quality uncertainty. 
Data 
Carcass data on 2590 slaughter steers was collected from a retained ownership study conducted 
by South Dakota State University. A random sampling procedure was employed to construct 
two data sets. The first dataset, labeled "Choice" data, consists of 2/3 choice grade steers and 1 /3 
select grade steers, whereas the second dataset "Select" includes 2/3 select grade steers and 1 /3 
choice grade steers. 1 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the two data sets. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics: Cattle Carcass Attributes 
Data Set/ Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Select Data Set: 
HCW 1 500 71 8.57 74.61 478.00 964.00 
QG 1 500 2.70 0.53 1 .00 4.00 
YG 1500 2.66 0.64 0.64 5.06 
Choice Data Set: 
HCW 1 500 719.37 73.84 478.00 964.00 
QG 1 500 2.35 0.52 1 .00 4.00 
YG 1 500 2.78 0.62 0.64 5.06 
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The carcass data were used to simulate weekly per-head market values using both a grid 
pricing system and the hot weight carcass (HCW) pricing system. Summary statistics for the 
weekly market simulation data were derived. Included in the summary statistics were the weekly 
statistical mean (n=1500) and standard deviation for: a) per-head grid and HCW revenues, b) the 
grid minus HCW differential using a "matched pairs" process, c) the standard deviation for grid 
revenue and HCW revenue, and d) the weekly grid revenue standard deviation minus the HCW 
standard deviation. The summary statistics data were collected for each week in the study and 
used to construct the 381 week data set (April 2001 to July 2008).2 The weekly matched pair 
price differential, [If!�0(GridREVi - HCWREVi)]/1500, is the variable of interest and is 
denoted as RevD1 for the high and low quality grade pens. Summary statistics describing the data 
can be found in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics: National Carcass Premiums and Discounts 
for Slaughter Steers and Heifers ($ per hundred weight) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Choice/Select 381 -9.81 4.44 -24.87 -2.84 
YG 1-2 381 2.88 0.29 1.89 4.30 
YG>5 381 -18.47 0.73 -22.71 -16.55 
Weekly grid price per-head was determined using a calculated weekly base price and the 
weekly AMS additive grid as proposed by Fausti et al. (1998). Weekly grid premium and 
discount data were collected from USDA-AMS weekly report (LM_CT155): National Carcass 
Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers. The pen level HCW weekly price 
data were collected from the Nebraska Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle-Negotiated Purchases 
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report (LM_CT1 58). The reported HCW price selected is for dressed delivered steers grading 
35% to 65% choice. 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Select Data Set: 
GRJDREV 381 939.54 1 1 5.22 698.71 1240.62 
SDGRIDRE 381 1 06.65 1 3.58 79.56 1 55.48 
HCWREV 381 944.87 1 14.9 1 702.75 1253.61 
SDHCW 381 98. 1 1 1 1 .93 72.97 1 30. 1 6  
DIFFREV* 381 -5.33 3.66 - 1 8.54 3.20 
DIFFSD· 381 8.54 5. 1 2  3.30 48.40 
Choice Data Set: 
GRID REV 381 963.31  1 1 8. 12  7 14.40 1 29 1 .02 
SDGRIDRE 381 1 08.94 1 4.07 81 . 1 1 1 53.94 
HCWREV 381 945.7 1  1 1 4.57 703.54 1 1 92.50 
SDHCW 381 97. 1 1  1 1 .82 72.2 1 1 28.81 
DIFFREV* 381 1 7.27 8.37 -3.64 42.36 
DIFFSD· 381 1 1 .83 6.01 3.02 36.84 
"*" denotes statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Explanatory variables were selected based on potential influence on RevD1• Given that 
carcass quality is being held constant over time, reported weekly AMS grid premiums and 
discounts, a seasonality dummy variable, and a time trend variable were selected as explanatory 
variables. Since grid premiums and discounts within the quality and yield grade categories are 
highly correlated, we selected the choice/select discount, yield grade 1 -2 premium, and the yield 
grade 5 discount as proxies for the grid pricing system in our empirical model. We converted the 
grid discounts to positive values by reversing the sign to simplify interpretation. 
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Methodology 
We employ an EARCH-in-Mean regression model to analyze revenue differential variability for 
the choice and select datasets. The revenue differential is defined as the pen average of the per-
head matched pair revenue difference between the AMS grid and the HCW pricing alternative. 
Following the price discovery literature (Ward 1 987, Feuz et al., 1 995, Fausti and Feuz, 1 995), 
we consider informational disparity over cattle quality and the associated financial risk as 
primary factors explaining the revenue differentials (market risk premium) between the two 
marketing alternatives. The general economic relationship is defined as RevD1 f(grid 
premiums, grid discounts, carcass quality risk). 
Other important factors are also included, such as past revenue differentials, the potential 
trend in preference for the AMS grid marketing alternative and seasonal price patterns. We 
propose the follo\.\-ing regression for the revenue differential for the two data sets: 
RevDt = const + L (/Ji RevDt-i + {J1selectpt + {J2yg2 t + {J3ygSpt + {J4Tt 
i=1 
(1) 
where RevD1 , const, Rev Dr.,, selectp,, yg2,, yg5 p1 , T;, DS, and h, are the weekly revenue 
differential, intercept, lagged revenue differential, the choice-select premium, the yield grade 1 -2 
premium, the yield grade 5 discount, time trend, seasonal dummy and conditional variance (risk) 
associated with the regression residual q 3, respectively. In particular, selectPt , yg21 and yg5 p1 
capture the informational disparity over quality; the logarithm of h, is considered as a proxy for 
risk. 
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Dickey-Fuller unit root tests confirmed stationary of all relevant variables used in the 
regression models. Durbin-Watson test statistics based on preliminary regression analysis 
indicate the error terms q are auto-correlated. The Q and LM test statistics show that a 
significant ARCH effect is present in the residuals of the regression. The following EAR CH 
(p,q) model is employed to account for the above effects. 
q + L Pn°r-n = Jh, e, (2) 
n=I 
ln(h,) =OJ+ I a,[Be,_, + (I e,_, 1-E I e,_, I)] (3) 
1=1 
where e, - i.i.d.N(O,l). 
Additionally, the EARCH model has two desirable features that are not available in the 
traditional (G)ARCH model. First, the parameters in (3) are not restricted to be positive. 
Second, the item in the bracket, denoted as g (  e,_,) = Be,_, + (I e,_, 1-E I e1_1 I) , can capture the 
asymmetric effects of residual shocks on the conditional variance. Asymmetry exists when the 
coefficient of e,_, is B + 1 for "good news" e,_, > 0 and B-1 for "bad news" e,_, < 0 .  In 
particular, Band the term I e,_, 1-E I e,_, I are often referred to as the sign effect and the size 
effect, respectively. 
Lastly, we determine the appropriate order of lags in Equations (1) through (3). For the 
regression model (Equation 1), we choose L=3 lags of RevD, for the choice dataset and 4 lags 
for the select dataset based on the 5% significance level. For the model of auto-correlated errors 
(Equation 2), we first assume constant h, and then run the regression model with auto-correlated 
errors. We remove insignificant lags from a maximum length of 13 (approximately equal to one 
quarter) based on backward elimination. More specifically, we retain the first four lags for the 
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choice dataset and the third and fourth orders for the select dataset. For the EAR CH model 
(Equation 3 ), we employ the minimum number of lags while ensuring the normality of the 
residual e1 • It amounts to the choice of q=9 for the choice dataset and q=5 for the select dataset.
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Using the above settings, we verify the suitability of the EGARCH-in-Mean regression 
model, reported in Table 4. The respective model fits the choice dataset better than the select 
dataset based on standard regression error measures (SSE, MSE, MAE , MAPE, and R2). The p-
values of the Jacque-Berra normality test are 0. 70 and 0. 75 for the choice and select datasets, 
respectively. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of normality of residual e,, which confirms the 
critical normality assumption of the EARCH model. 
Table 4. Model Diagnostics 
Choice Select 
OBS 378.00 377.00 
LogLik -502.93 -551 .46 
SSE 409.80 61 3.03 
MSE 1 .08 1 .63 
MAE 0.75 0.88 
MAPE 4.76 43. 1 3  
R-Sq. 0.98 0.88 
SBC 1 1 66. 1 0  1 233.43 
AIC 1 059.86 1 1 46.92 
AICC 1064. 18  1 149.78 
J-B Test 0.72 0.57 
Pr>% 0.70 0.75 
Empirical Results 
The summary statistics presented in Table 3 are consistent with the empirical literature on grid 
pricing. Summary statistics reflect long-run marketing outcomes for two pens of cattle holding 
carcass quality attributes constant over time. Empirical evidence indicates that higher quality 
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cattle are rewarded on a grid and lower quality cattle are penalized relative to selling at an 
average pnce. Regardless of cattle carcass quality, revenue variability is higher when marketing 
on a grid. 
The summary statistics also provide insight on the relationship between financial risk and 
carcass quality uncertainty. Assume the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of his/her 
cattle and the producer owns both the choice and select pens. Summary statistics provided in 
Table 3 show that for these two sets of cattle there is an average per-head revenue differential of 
$23.77 when marketing above average cattle on a grid relative to selling below average cattle on 
a grid ($963 .3 1 -939.54). If the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of the cattle 
he/she is selling, then this revenue differential represents the per-head financial risk the producer 
faces. On the other hand, comparing revenue from selling below and above average cattle at an 
average HCW price resulted in only an 84 cent HCWP per-head differential between pens. In 
this case, the financial risk the producer faces is almost zero. This non-zero differential is the 
result of the minimal weight difference across pens. These findings are consistent with 
Anderson and Zeuli (200 1 :  p. 284) who concluded that: "Errors in the seller ' s  judgment ofa pen 
of cattle ' s  quality can have a significant impact on grid pricing returns, while having little or no 
impact on returns to live pricing.'' 
The EARCH-in-Mean regression model is estimated using maximum likelihood. The 
results for the choice and select datasets are reported in the left and right panels of Table 5, 
respectively. We analyze the regression results before presenting the EAR CH model. All results 
are compared between the two datasets. 
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Table 5. EARCH-in-Mean Regression Results 
Choice Select 
Std. Std. 
Variable Estimate Error. t-value prob. Estimate Error. t-value prob. 
Constant 1 .880 2 . 1 73 0.87 0.3 868 4.9 1 1 1 .703 2 .88 0.0039 
RevD,_ 1 0.06 1 9  0.030 2.05 0.0406 0.460 0.040 1 1 .39  <.000 1 
RevD,_2 -0.0790 0.028 -2.83 0.0046 0.0 1 9  0.035 0.53 0.5934 
RevD,_3 0.0539 0.027 2.04 0.04 1 8  -0.278 0.036 -7.82 <.000 1 
Rev� _4 
- - - - 0.080 0.028 2.92 0 .0035 
selectp 1 . 562 0.044 35.60 <.000 1 -0.485 0.022 -22. 1 3  <.000 1 
yg2 1 .770 0.25 1 7.06 <.000 1 3 .0 1 3  0.222 1 3 .56 <.000 1 
yg5p -0.590 0.087 -6.83 <.000 1 -0.992 0.078 - 1 2 .77 <.000 1 
T 0.0 1 2  0.003 4.00 <.000 1 0.0 1 3  0.00 1 9.60 <.000 1 
DS l 0 .377 0. 1 92 1 .97 0.0492 0.036 0. 1 27 0.29 0.7740 
DS2 0.763 0.352 2. 1 7  0.0303 0.6 1 7  0. 1 84 3 . 34 0.0008 
DS3 0.6 1 2  0 .321 1 .9 1  0.0565 0.377 0. 1 70 2.22 0.0263 
ARl ( p1 ) -0.633 0.063 - 1 0.00 <.0001 - - - -
AR2( p2 ) -0.242 0.07 1 -3 .39 0.0007 - - - -
AR3( p3 ) 0.040 0.070 0.57 0.5656 -0.504 0.03 5 - 14 .33 <.000 1 
AR4( p4 ) -0.079 0.05 1 - 1 .55 0. 1 2 1 1 -0.306 0.032 -9.54 <.000 1 
EARCHO( w )  -0. 1 52 0. 1 79 -0.85 0.3965 0. 1 3 7  0.203 0.68 0.4985 
EARCH1 ( a1 ) 0.478 0. 1 37 3 .49 0.0005 1 . 1 60 0. 1 1 1  1 0.45 <.0001 
EARCH2( a2 ) 0.626 0. 1 29 4.86 <.000 1 0.622 0. 1 23 5 .05 <.000 1 
EARCH3( a3 ) 0.786 0. 1 37 5 .72 <.0001 0.935 0 . 1 36  6.89 <.000 1 
EARCH4( a4 ) 0.263 0. 1 39  1 . 89 0.0591  0.777 0. 1 20 6.47 <.000 1 
EARCH5( a5 ) -0.062 0. 146 -0.42 0.674 1 0.227 0. 1 08 2. 1 1  0.0350 
EARCH6( a6 ) 0.0 1 3  0. 1 34 0.09 0.9259 - - - -
EARCH7( a7 ) 0.085 0. 1 25 0.68 0.4960 - - - -
EARCH8( a8 ) -0. 1 20 0. 1 37 -0.87 0.3820 - - - -
EARCH8( a9 ) 0.469 0. 1 1 8 3 .98 <.000 1 - - - -
e -0 . 1 93 0.076 -2.53 0.01 1 3  -0. 1 33 0.060 -2.22 0.0267 
8 -0. 1 20 0.066 - 1 .79 0.0728 -0. 1 5 8  0.038 -4. 1 8  <.000 1 
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Regression Results: Grid Premiums and Discounts 
In Table 5, the estimated coefficient for the choice-select discount selectp, is $1.56 for the 
choice dataset vs. -$0.49 for the select dataset. The choice-select discount essentially functions 
as a market signal on the current revenue differential between carcasses with a higher percentage 
in the level of intramuscular fat and carcasses with a lower percentage. The grid pricing 
literature has documented that the quality grade price differential is the dominant carcass 
characteristic explaining per-head revenue variability (e.g., Johnson and Ward 2005 & 2006). 
The empirical estimates for selectp, indicates that for a one dollar increase in the choice 
premium (select discount) will; a) increase the per-head revenue differential (the incentive to 
market on a grid) for the choice pen by $1.56, and b) lower the per-head revenue differential (the 
disincentive to market on a grid) for the select pen by $0.49. Our empirical estimates clearly 
indicate that change in the choice/select spread alters the financial risk producers' face when 
deciding to sell cattle on a grid or market by the pen. 
Empirical estimates for the yield grade premium and discount variables indicate that they 
affect the per head revenue differential ( RevD, ) for the choice and select pens. The premium 
"yg2" for high yielding (boneless retail cuts) carcasses has a positive relationship with the per 
head revenue differential for both the choice and select pens. As in the case of the choice/select 
spread, our empirical estimates indicate that a change in "yg2" premium affects the incentive 
(disincentive) to sell cattle on a grid (by the pen). For the select pen, a one dollar increase in the 
"yg2" premium will decrease the per-head revenue differential discount (based on -$5.33 
statistical mean for the per head revenue differential) by $3.01 to -$2.32. Thus a one dollar 
increase in the "yg2" premium reduces the incentive to market the select pen at an average price. 
On the other hand, for the choice pen, the incentive to market on a grid increases by $1. 77. 
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These empirical estimates suggest, ceteris paribus, a $1 increase in the yg2 premium increases 
the producer's incentive to market on a grid regardless of carcass quality expectations. 
The final grid price variable included in the model is yield grade 5 (yg5p) and the 
coefficients are negative in both the choice and the select models. A one dollar increase in the 
"yg5p" discount will reduce the incentive to se11 the choice pen on a grid by $0.59 and for the 
select pen, the incentive to market by the pen increases by $0.99. This implies, ceteris paribus, a 
$1 increase in the yg5p premium reduces the producer's incentive to market on a grid regardless 
of carcass quality expectations. 
One interesting implication from our analysis above suggests that a simultaneous increase 
in the choice-select discount and the yield grade 1-2 premium will send conflicting market 
signals to producers of lower quality grade cattle but a positive market signal to producers of 
higher quality grade cattle. This inherent conflict in the structure of the grid pricing system 
appears to be a "barrier to adoption" that has not been identified in the previous literature. 
Regression Results: Time Trend and Seasonality 
The literature has yet to answer the question: is the incentive structure of the grid pricing system 
evolving over time? The estimated time trend regression coefficients can help address this 
question. From Table 5, we find that T is positive and statistically significant in both models. 
This implies that during the sample period (2001-2008) the revenue differential for both the 
choice and select datasets exhibited a positive trend. This suggests that the incentive to market 
high and low quality cattle on the grid has strengthened over time. 
In a recent article by Fausti et al. (201 Oa), it is reported that grid market share of steer and 
heifer slaughter volume increased from 35.8% in 2004 to 38.8% in 2008. The increase in grid 
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market share of slaughter volume is consistent with our empirical finding that the incentive 
mechanism for marketing on the grid has strengthened and the incentive to market by the pen has 
declined during the period covered in the data. Documentation of the evolving nature of the grid 
pricing system's incentive mechanism provides opportunities for additional research on this 
issue. 
Peel and Meyer (2002) discuss the seasonal pattern in fed cattle prices; price is lower in 
the summer and higher otherwise. The revenue differential doesn't  follow the same seasonal 
pattern and has been discussed in the grid pricing literature. In our model, the quarterly seasonal 
dummy variables (DSi : i= l to 3) is defined as O for the January through March quarter, one 
otherwise. For the select dataset the third and fourth quarter coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. All three seasonal dummy coefficients are positive and significant at 
the 10% level for the choice dataset. Our seasonality estimates indicate that the incentive to 
market high quality cattle in the spring, summer and fall strengthens. However, for the select 
dataset, the positive coefficients indicate the incentive to market below average cattle by the pen 
is reduced in the 3rd and 4rd quarters. Therefore, the revenue differential does exhibit seasonality 
and the estimates suggest the seasonal effects are stronger for high quality cattle. Our results 
appear to be consistent with previous seasonal patterns reported in the literature ( e.g., Fausti and 
Qasmi 2002). Fausti and Qasmi find that if producers are uncertain about the quality of cattle 
they are selling, the revenue differential between high and low quality cattle narrows in the 
winter and spring quarters and widens in the summer and fall quarters. In contrast, we find that 
seasonal effect is actually a positive shift in the incentive structure favoring the marketing option 
of selling on a grid during the summer and fall. 
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EARCH-in-Mean A1odel Results and Implications for Afarketing Risk 
The EARCH-in-Mean model can be decomposed into five effects: the sign effect Be1 , the size 
eff ect5 I e1 I I e1 I , the ARCH effect a ,  and risk premium 8ln(h1 ) .  The sign (or asymmetry) 
effect is statistically significant and negative for both datasets. A non-zero B indicates 
asymmetric response of conditional variance to past shocks. The majority of the ARCH 
coefficients are positive for both datasets, implying that the past negative (positive) shocks are 
associated with higher (lower) conditional variance h1 given a negative O .
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To visualize the asymmetry, the item that combines the sign and size effects 
g (  e,_, ) = Oel-i + (I e1_1 1-E I e1_1 I) is plotted as a function of the shock e1_1 for the choice and 
select datasets in Figure 1. The conditional variance (logarithm ) of the residuals ( conditional on 
the information up to period t-1: H1_ 1 )  for the choice and select datasets increases more in 
response to negative shocks to the revenue differential ( 0 -1) than to positive shocks ( 0 + 1 ) .  
The inference is that the volatility associated with the revenue differential is more sensitive to 
negative shocks than positive shocks, as shown in the first quadrant of Figure 1. This implies the 
financial consequence of increased uncertainty associated with the revenue differential is higher 
for negative shocks relative to positive shocks (first vs. second quadrant). 
For any particular week, the per-head revenue differential represents the market risk 
premium, positive for above average quality cattle and negative for below average quality cattle. 
The producer' s  marketing decision to sell by the pen or on the grid \Vill be determined by a 
comparison of the individual seller's risk premium as determined by his/her risk preferences 
relative to the market risk premium (see Fausti et al. 2012). lf there is greater uncertainty 
surrounding the market risk premium (holding its expected value constant), then risk averse 
sellers will increase their required risk premium to sell on a grid. Thus, ceteris paribus, there will 
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be a subgroup of sellers who will shift from marketing on a grid to marketing by the pen (Fausti 
et al. 20 1 2). Empirical evidence indicates both positive and negative shocks to the revenue 
differential will increase the level of uncertainty associated with the market risk premium. 
On a final note, our discussion of the asymmetric effect of shocks on the conditional 
variance implies that the level of uncertainty associated with the market risk premium is 
dependent on cattle quality (Figure l ). For the select (choice) dataset uncertainty associated with 
the market risk premium is more sensitive to positive (negative) shocks relative to the choice 
(select) dataset. We conclude that shocks to the market risk premium will alter risk-averse 
producers' marketing decisions in a manner consistent with Fausti et al. (20 1 2) :  
a) A positive price shock will increase the incentive to market on a grid [e.g., if  �et > 0 then 
�GridRevt - �HCWRevt >OJ. A negative shock wil l  increase the disincentive to market 
on a grid. These results hold regardless of cattle quality. 
b) For above average cattle, a positive shock increases the incentive to market on the grid 
but it also increases the risk. In this case, the effect of the shock is dependent upon the 
producer' s  risk preferences. A risk neutral producer wil l  view the positive shock as an 
increase in  the incentive to market on a grid. A risk-averse producer' s view wil l  be 
dependent upon their degree of risk aversion. On the other hand, a negative shock results 
in an increase in the disincentive to market on the grid but also increases the risk. In this 
case, the dual effects of a negative price shock are reinforcing. This implies that both 
risk- neutral and risk-averse producers will view a negative price shock as a weakening of 
the incentive to market on a grid. 
c) For below average cattle, a positive shock reduces the disincentive to market on the grid 
but increases risk so the effect on a producer's marketing decision is dependent on risk 
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preferences. For a negative shock, the disincentive to market on the grid increases and 
the risk increases. In this case, risk-neutral and risk-averse producers will view a 
negative price shock as strengthening the disincentive to market on a grid. 
Figure 1. Asymmetric Effects of Shocks on Risks 
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The last issue to be addressed is the effect of a change in the conditional variance on the 
market risk premium. Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) introduced the ARCH-in-M model, 
which allows the conditional variance to affect the mean, to show that a risk-averse investor will 
demand a risk premium to hold long term bonds relative to short term bonds. In our model, we 
take the logarithm of conditional variance because it is the only functional form that ensures the 
normality of the ARCH residual.7 The volatility effect on the market risk premium is captured 
by (8), which is statistically significant and negative for both datasets. A simple description of 6 
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is that it represents the component of the market risk premium due to the uncertainty. A proxy 
for this uncertainty would be the standard deviations associated with mean values reported for 
DiffRev in Table 3 for the choice and select datasets. If we assume that the conditional variance 
is a proxy for the risk, the risk premium (o) associated with logarithm of h1 is statistically 
significant and negative for the select and choice datasets. We interpret this result as an 
indication that sellers of fed cattle are more willing to market their cattle by the pen in order to 
avoid an even larger penalty on the grid when there is greater uncertainty surrounding the market 
risk premium. The EARCH model confirms the view in the literature that carcass quality 
uncertainty injects financial risk into the marketing decision. Thus, increased producer 
uncertainty over the market risk premium renders their decision to sell cattle on a grid to be 
inherently risker. 
Summary 
There are three pricing alternatives that producers have to select from when marketing their fed 
cattle (live weight, dressed weight, and grid). The coexistence of pen level pricing systems with 
the individual animal grid pricing system is an obstacle in the path of the beef industry's goal of 
transforming itself into a value based production and marketing system. Selling cattle at an 
average price by the pen is still very appealing to producers, who are risk-averse, or lack the 
financial capital to adopt value based production technology, or lack economies of scale to gain 
access to marketing outlets that offer a grid pricing alternative (see Fausti et al. 2010  for 
additional discussion on these issues). However, changes in the grid incentive structure can 
mitigate these barriers . The empirical evidence suggests that changes in yield grade premiums 
are more effective in shifting the incentive structure in the direction that is more favorable for 
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marketing on a grid than changes in the select/choice discount for below average quality grade 
cattle. 
The empirical evidence clearly shows how the financial risk of carcass quality 
uncertainty is injected into producer marketing decisions with respect to sell ing on a grid versus 
sel ling by the pen at an average price. An equally important contribution to the literature is the 
analysis of how producers react to shocks to the grid incentive mechanism. Evidence suggests 
that negative shocks reduce the incentive to market on a grid and increase the incentive to market 
by the pen at an average price. Thus, the financial risk associated with shocks will continue to 
affect producer marketing decisions and remain a barrier to adoption. However, the adoption of 
VBM production and marketing technology does offer producers a tool to mitigate their 
exposure to this type of financial risk. 
Finally, empirical results suggest that the grid premium and discount structure is slowly 
adjusting in a manner that encourages marketing on a grid and discourages marketing by the pen 
at an average price. If this trend continues, grid market share of steer and heifer slaughter 
volume should increase in the future. 
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Footnotes 
I Additional information on these data sets can be found in Fausti et al. ( 1 998). 
2 We did not include AMS grid premium and discount data from October 1 996 to April 200 1 
(pre mandatory livestock price reporting period) due a recent study by Fausti et al. (20 1 0b). This 
study suggests that AMS publicly reported weekly grid premium and discount data may have 
been influenced by sample selection bias. 
3Conditional variance h1 is defined precisely by the EARCH model in Equations (2) and (3). 
The conditional variance reflects volatility in the per-head revenue differential i .e. , the price 
incentive to market on a grid. The conditional variance is the proxy for financial risk associated 
with that incentive. 
4We also estimated the same model with an added EGARCH term. We find that the GARCH 
term is not statistically significant regardless of lag length. Therefore, we choose the EARCH-in­
Mean model, instead of EGARCH-in-Mean modeling procedure. 
5 Here we fix the magnitude of the size effect to be " 1  ", instead of a multiplication of 
( I e1 1-E I e, I ) for simplicity. 
6 The expectation of the ARCH term is a *  E[g (e1 )] a *  B* E(e1 I e1 > 0) . For example, if a >  0 
a negative () will result in negative value of the ARCH term when et > 0 .  The opposite holds 
when et < 0. 
7 Two other forms were examined, the linear form as in Engle, Lilien and Robins ( 1 987) and the 
square-root form. Neither produces an ARCH residual that passes the normality test. In fact, 
Engle, Lilien and Robins ( 1 987) find that the log-linear form is preferred to the linear form in 
their empirical test. 
26 
